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INTRODUCTION

"Judge Blocks Trump. ..
1 This headline became a media
staple when reporting on lawsuits challenging various Trump
Administration policies-many of which sought injunctive relief
on a nationwide scale. Two United States Attorneys General
have challenged judges' authority to issue these nationwide injunctions and called for "our judiciary to re-examine a practice
that embitters the political life of the nation, flouts constitutional principles, and stultifies sound judicial administration." 2
In the popular and political mind, the nationwide injunction
begins and ends in the courts. To jurists like Clarence Thomas,
courts are central to eradicating the nationwide injunction
through the exercise of greater self-restraint by lower-court
judges, legislatively imposed constraints, or Supreme Court invalidation on constitutional grounds. 3 Legal scholars are not
very different. Their engagement with the nationwide injunction
in public-law litigation has focused nearly exclusively on courts. 4
1. Ted Hesson, Judge Blocks Trump Move to Deny Green Card to Recipients of
Government Benefits, POLITIcO (Oct. 11, 2019, 3:04 PM), https://www.politico.com
Inews/2019/10/1 1/judge-blocks-trump-green-card-public-benefits-regulation044666 [https://perma.cc/N4LX-KF66].
2. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att'y Gen., to Heads of Civil
Litigating Components U.S. Att'ys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the
Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
press-release/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/B64W-EQHH]; William P.
Barr, Opinion, End Nationwide Injunctions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019, 6:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/end-nationwide-injunctions- 11567723072
[https://
perma.cc/JQ84-EPDN].
3. Dep't of Homeland Security v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("[Nationwide injunctions] raise serious questions about
the scope of courts' equitable powers under Article III."). Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2425-26 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (challenging the constitutionality
of the nationwide injunction and calling for judicial resolution of the issue).
4. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017) (arguing that the nationwide injunction
does not conform to the dictates of Article III's constraints on judicial authority);
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018)
(arguing in favor of nationwide injunction's conformance with Article III); Howard
M. Wasserman, "Nationwide"Injunctions Are Really "Universal"Injunctions and
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They inquire about the possible sources of judicial authority to
issue nationwide injunctions, the extent to which they are consistent with other mechanisms for organizing litigation, and the
most appropriate response to either discipline or eradicate their
use.
This Essay asserts that this "court-centered account" ignores lessons both about courts and, by extension, the
nationwide injunction. Courts are embedded within a larger institutional ecosystem made up of Congress, the President, the
bureaucracy, and the wider public. 5 How might we better understand the nationwide injunction if we add this ecosystem to the
conversation?
A turn to the larger political context-what I call the "political-context account"-ought not to surprise anyone, as many
nationwide injunctions involve the most contentious issues in
American politics today, including immigration, transgender
6
rights, the Affordable Care Act, and labor policy, to name a few.

They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018) (arguing that
the nationwide injunction does not conform to the dictates of Article III's
constraints on judicial authority). One of the few academic commentaries that
addresses the issue of congressional gridlock is Suzette M. Malveaux, ClassActions,
Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 62-63 (2017).
5. The concept of an "ecology" or "ecosystem" is not foreign to separation-ofpowers frameworks. For example, Aziz Huq and John Michaels highlight what they
suggest is an underappreciated dynamic that impacts separation of powers;
specifically, they argue that intrabranch actors account for much of the dynamism
of separation-of-powers values. Aziz Z. Huq & John D. Michaels, The Cycles of
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 391 (2016). But I mean
something more than this. By "ecology" I mean to highlight the wider institutional
environment and context in which institutional interactions take place. Here, I am
guided by James Q. Wilson's classic study, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 3, 27 (1989) (explaining organizational
behavior as a response to a critical environmental problem-i.e., "situations that
the organization encounters"). This suggests that organizations are adaptive to
environmental factors. It is this adaptive quality of institutions-specifically, the
nationwide injunction as an institutional adaptation to the environmental problem
of unilateral executive action-that this Essay seeks to highlight.
6. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff'd, 888
F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (issuing a nationwide injunction against the Trump
Administration's policy on sanctuary cities); State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140
(D. Haw. 2017), rev'd in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd by, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018) (issuing a nationwide injunction on the Trump Administration's travel
restriction policy); Texas v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
(issuing a nationwide injunction against the Obama Administration's policy
requiring schools receiving federal funds not discriminate against transgender
students by, among other things, allowing them to use the bathroom of their gender
identity); Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
(issuing nationwide injunction against regulations promulgated pursuant to the
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To be sure, the controversial issues litigated using nationwide
injunctions may explain why many scholars have resisted the
temptation to understand these injunctions within a broader political context. Instead, these scholars couch their analyses in
themes that appeal to partisans of all stripes-including the vindication of separation of powers, the minimization of forum
shopping, and the disincentivization of courts as a "last resort"
after political losses.7 But as valuable as these analytical impulses may be, they may reinforce an inaccurate narrative of the
judiciary as standing apart from politics. This risks failing to see
the ways that courts are impacted by the actions (or inactions)
of other institutions-specifically, Congress and the President.
And while everything is surely not collapsible into politics, the
power of our prescriptions must be informed by a willingness to
honestly confront underlying problems.
Legal scholarship on nationwide injunctions remains quite
young. Nevertheless, a rather sturdy academic consensus has
developed in short order. 8 It is what I call a "court-centered account" of the nationwide injunction. Civil procedure, remedies
doctrine, and the law of federal courts all dominate the courtcentered account. 9 Though this is not at all surprising, as these

Affordable Care Act's nondiscrimination provision); Nevada v. U.S. Dep't. of Labor,
218 F. Supp.3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against the
Obama Administration's overtime rule).
7. This impulse is evidenced by the leading scholar on nationwide injunctions,
Samuel Bray, during a congressional hearing on the subject. Bray described the
nationwide injunction as an "obscure" judicial remedy with roots in the 1960s and

1970s that
was weaponized by Republican state attorneys general to stop major
Obama administration programs. Now, turnabout is fair play. In other
words, whether you are Democrat or a Republican, sometime in the last 3
years your ox has been gored by the national injunction. My hope is that
this bipartisan pain offers an opportunity. We do not have to be distracted
by the latest national injunction. We can take longer view. We can get the
law right.
Regarding the political focus on courts, see The Role and Impact of Nationwide
Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., and the Internet, H. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. (2018)
(statement of Samuel Bray, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG- 1 15hhrg32475/html/CHRG115hhrg32475.htm [https://perma.cc/L3G3-BZRV].
8. See supra note 4.
9. For other court-centered analyses, see Michael T. Morley, Nationwide
Injunctions, Rule 23 (B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 615 (2017) [hereinafter Morley, Nationwide Injunctions]; Michael T.
Morley, De Facto Class Actions: Plaintiff- and Defendant-OrientedInjunctions in
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branches of law focus primarily on courts, the court-centered account risks isolating federal courts from a phenomenon that extends far beyond their institution. The search for analogous
precedent in civil procedure, remedies doctrine, and the law of
federal courts requires a further turn away from the political dimension of the issue of nationwide injunctions and demands an
answer grounded in rigorous doctrinal engagement. Scholars
ask, "Have courts ever been allowed to do this?" instead of "Why
do courts do this?" This isolates courts from other institutional
actors and avoids the question of why the nationwide injunction
emerged during this political era. The answer to this question,
this Essay contends, requires an interrogation of not only courts
but of Congress and the President as well.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I will defend the proposition that moving beyond courts is necessary to better understand nationwide injunctions and the courts that issue them.
Such a move allows an appreciation of the political context in
which the nationwide injunction has emerged and is deployed.
Part II will articulate and compare the court-centered and political-context accounts of the nationwide injunction. Part III will
explore the dimensions of my political-context account by turning to a brief discussion of congressional gridlock through an examination of partisan polarization in Congress and the "insecure
majorities" thesis that exacerbates polarization in today's legislature. Part III will also examine unilateral presidential authority as an underlying factor in the surge of nationwide
injunctions. This Essay will conclude with a brief discussion of
how understanding nationwide injunctions through my politicalcontext account may challenge allegations that nationwide injunctions are uncontrovertibly unconstitutional.
I.

SEEING COURTS, CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENCY IN THE
NATIONWIDE INJUNCTION

The upsurge in the use of nationwide injunctions as a remedial tool by federal district courts rightly raises interest in federal courts. 10 Understanding the upsurge in the deployment of

Voting Rights, Election Law, and other ConstitutionalCases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 487 (2016) [hereinafter Morley, De Facto Class Actions].

10. See, e.g., Kate Benner, Nationwide Injunctions Speak to Judiciary's
Growing Power, Barr Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
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the nationwide injunction requires that we pay attention to
those courts. The nationwide injunction represents the development of a particular type of judicial capacity. 1 1 At least in the
context of public-law adjudication against policies enacted by
democratically accountable actors, this development and deployment takes place in a political context.
Understanding the context in which courts issue nationwide
injunctions requires understanding courts as institutions embedded in an ecosystem that includes more than simply "rogue"
judges or judicial doctrine. 1 2 Courts are political institutions
with their own agendas for building capacity to resolve societal
challenges. 13 This dynamic forces us to consider the ways that
courts exist as both competitors to and allies with other political
institutions. 14 Competition and alliances with other institutions
undermines attempts by the court to empower, isolate, insulate,
constrain, dictate, and enhance the prestige, capacity, and autonomy of courts. One need only think about President Franklin
Roosevelt's "court-packing" reform, which was intended not only
to enhance judicial efficiency and capacity but also to construct

/2019/05/21/us/politics/barr-nationwide-injunctions.html

[https://perma.cc/H9KU-

RRFZ].
11. I understand judicial capacity to mean the ability of judicial institutions to
undertake a particular task. Such capacity involves its jurisdictional authority, but
also "structural organization of the judiciary" along with the norms held by judges.
Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of ConstitutionalLaw, 122
YALE L.J. 422, 424 (2012). See also JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW,
COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT xiv, 4 (2012) (ebook)
("[Judicial power] . . . more commonly and more foundationally derives from
interaction with political elites, from empowering legislation, and from public,
media, and interest group support.").
12. Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won't; FederalCourts and Civil
Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-1985, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483,
484 (2003) (arguing that courts' ability to integrate labor unions was the result of
"[e]lected officials [who] provided judges the power to determine civil rights law and
establish remedies and encouraged private litigation by passing numerous statutes
that made court strategies more affordable for civil rights groups").
13. CROWE, supra note 11, at 199-212 (discussing the ways in which the
judiciary, under the leadership of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, developed
the organizational autonomy that allowed it to manage its role in dispute
resolution, including, but not limited to diminishing the role of mandatory
jurisdiction in shaping the Supreme Court's docket).
14. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use Courts to Advance
Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 511, 512-13 (2002) (describing how the expansion of national economic
enterprise required "more reliable legal institutions to investors and producers who
operated within a national market," thereby making an empowered judiciary a part
of the Republican Party's agenda at the end of the nineteenth century).
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a more Roosevelt-friendly court. 15 What follows in this Essay is
premised upon a reading of federal courts as institutions whose
development is embedded within a political context.
Understanding the political context in which the nationwide
injunction emerges and is deployed requires paying attention to
the institutions that make up that larger political ecosystem. For
example, focusing on Marbury v. Madison 6-likely the most
significant institutional development in the history of the
federal courts-as merely an articulation of doctrine or a mere
interpretation of the Constitution alongside the debates of the
drafting and ratification periods misses a large part of the
story. 17 Marbury surely is not capable of fully explaining why,
after having assumed the authority to review congressional
action, the Court refused to exercise that authority in the case
before it.18 Moreover, Marbury does not explain why other
institutions ally with the Court to enhance its authority. 19
Finally, Marbury does not tell us why a practice might be
deployed at one time as against another. 20 These are all

15. On Roosevelt's "court-packing plan," see, for example, WILLIAM E.
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LEUCHTENBURG,
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133-34 (1995) (highlighting Roosevelt's
emphasis on overcrowded dockets as, in part, a result of "aged or infirm" judges,
whose advanced age might "[lead them] to avoid an examination of complicated and
changed conditions").
16. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
17. For a rejection of the court-centered narrative of judicial review, see KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 1, 9 (2007) ("The judiciary may assert its own supremacy over
constitutional interpretation, but such claims ultimately must be supported by
other political actors making independent decisions about how the constitutional
system should operate.").
18. Though the Court clearly concluded that Marbury had a right to delivery of
the commission at issue in the dispute, the Court held that it was without
jurisdiction to decide the dispute because the Judiciary Act of 1789
unconstitutionally gave it jurisdiction. Commentators have argued that Marshall
was motivated to act in this way because of his fear that the Court-and he-was
institutionally vulnerable. For a discussion, see Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 87, 98 (1996) ("[The
Federalists believed Jefferson was out to destroy the judiciary by removing all
Federalist judges.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
19. See Gillman, supra note 14, at 512 ("[T]he expansion of federal judicial
power in the late nineteenth century is best understood as the sort of familiar
partisan or programmatic entrenchment.").
20. On the importance of time in institutional evolution, see PAUL PIERSON,
POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2004)
("[Systematically situating particular moments (including the present) in a
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questions that are as applicable to the emergence and
deployment of the nationwide injunction (or other judicial tools)
as they are to the practice of judicial review more generally.
Delivering a detailed historical account of the politics leading to the nationwide injunction is somewhat beyond the scope
of this Essay. But this Essay hypothesizes that a key component
of the recent increase in nationwide injunction deployment
likely was increased partisan polarization in Congress that led
to increasingly gridlocked legislative processes, which in turn
led to increased presidential unilateral action. 2 1 One response
to my hypothesis might reasonably be that prior polarization did
not lead to nationwide injunctions in the past. 2 2 Another response is that presidential authority increased for most of the
twentieth century without the nationwide injunction becoming
a commonplace tool in the judicial remedial toolkit. 2 3
These responses may be true, but the consequences of polarization would be different in an era of a less institutionally
powerful presidency. Partisan polarization's impact on contemporary American politics is not limited to the fact of its
occurrence but rather by the timing of its occurrence and the sequence of other events unfolding alongside it. 24 Apprehended in
this way, partisan polarization and congressional gridlock mean
something decidedly different after the growth of the administrative state, the rise of the national security state, and other
augmentations of executive branch authority. The nationwide
injunction is an adaptive response by the judiciary to a system
under pressure by the imbalances created by an increasingly
powerful presidency set further free from effective congressional
oversight because of gridlock.

temporal sequence of events and processes stretching over extended periods ... can
greatly enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics.").
21. See discussion accompanying notes infra 69-143.
22. See, e.g., David W. Brady & Hahrie Han, Our Politics May Be Polarized.
But That's Nothing New., WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2014, 5:30 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/16/our-politics-may-bepolarized-but-thats-nothing-new/ [https://perma.cclD8HN-LTPS].
23. See, e.g., Mark Byrnes, The Presidency and Domestic Policy, 11 OAH
MAGAZINE HISTORY 21 (1997) (identifying Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
as twentieth-century expanders of presidential power).
24. See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in
Political Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. GOV'T 72, 76 (2000) ("[P]reviously viable
options may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive
feedback, and [] cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make
change difficult and will condition the form in which new branchings will occur.").
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As Pierson put it, these path-dependent processes impact
tools that institutions develop-that is, the nationwide injunction-and the timing of their deployment-the current era. 2 5
For example, how do Congress's decisions to delegate authority
bolster the President's role as Congress's policymaking
competitor, thereby making it tougher for subsequent
Congresses to challenge the President on those delegated
areas? 2 6 How do these accretions of advantage over time allow

the executive to act differently under conditions that develop
later in time-like the emergence (or reemergence) of polarized
legislative institutions?
The variable-a polarized Congress-behaves differently
and produces different outcomes in this new institutional environment than it likely would have at other periods. The same
applies to unilateral executive action. While unilateral presidential action may have been present for a significant proportion of
the Republic, this "snapshot" view of political development suggests to some that unilateral executive action ought to produce
the same results in all political contexts. 2 7 This Essay's focus on
factors that may long predate the nationwide injunction rejects
that assumption.
Nothing above should be read to suggest that the judiciary
is irrelevant in this narrative. A judiciary without the capacity
to see itself as a central actor in the resolution of societal challenges might not have been capable of responding with remedial
creativity had it not flexed those muscles earlier in settings like
school integration after Brown v. Board of Education2 8 or during
29
Indeed, even with the
the prison reform litigation of the 1970s.

25. Id. at 79-84.
26. For example, the President's development of budgetary expertise in the
Office of Management and Budget gives the President advantages in domestic
policy that earlier Presidents did not possess. These transform the President's
dependence on bargaining with Congress because unilateral action may yield
policies that are relatively less bad and, potentially, decidedly better when
Congress is unable to act. See Gleason Judd, Showing Off: Promise and Peril in
UnilateralPolicymaking, 12 Q. J. POL. SCI. 241 (2017) (addressing the President's
calculus for unilateral action); see also Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, 4
TRANS-ACTION 162 (1966) (discussing the differences in presidential bargaining
positions in the domestic and foreign policy domain, arguing that the President has
greater bargaining advantages in the foreign policy domain).
27. Pierson, supra note 20.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. For a discussion of the federal courts' exercise of remedial creativity, see
PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988) (focusing on complex remedial decrees by
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possession of both doctrinal and institutional capacity to deploy
innovative remedial devices like the nationwide injunction,
courts might not deploy such capacity for many different reasons, including political reasons. As such, the deployment must
be understood as involving a calculation of whether the risk of
using the nationwide injunction outweighs the benefits. 3 0 This
is not the only way of thinking about the nationwide-injunction
phenomenon. But thinking about the nationwide injunction
against the backdrop of Congress and the President allows us to
appreciate the significance of how those institutions might impact a judge's decision that issuing a nationwide injunction is
rational.
II.

COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF THE NATIONWIDE INJUNCTION

The dominant account of the emergence and deployment of
the nationwide injunction is the court-centered account. This account has been the basis of the normative critique of the nationwide injunction. Against this court-centered account, this Part
introduces the political-context account of the nationwide injunction and explains its congruity with the theoretical framework articulated above.
The dominant, court-centered account is found in the media,
politics, and academic literature. 3 1 The court-centered account
trains its eye on courts as the source of the "problem" of the nationwide injunction. Seeing courts as the source constrains the
focus of the inquiry on doctrines, or other tools, that empower,
discipline, and constrain judicial exercises of authority. As such,
the court-centered account has primarily focused on the nationwide injunction as a distortion of the role of the judiciary, a
federal district courts in school desegregation, prison, and mental health disputes,
among others).
30. On courts as strategic actors, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a
StrategicRevolution in JudicialPolitics:A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES.
Q. 625 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Max Bloom, American District Courts Wield Too Much Power,
NAT'L REV. (July 7, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.nationalreview.coni/2017/07/usdistrict-courts-too-powerful-nationwide-injunctions-hurt-legal-system/
[https://
perma.cc/RUV8-YWFG]; Kerry Eleveld, How Conservative FederalJudges in Texas
Are Putting a Stranglehold on President Obama's Policies, DAILY KOS (Oct. 27,
2016, 11:16 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2016/10/27/1587515/-Howconservative-federal-judges-in-Texas-are-putting-a-stranglehold-on-PresidentObama-s-policies [https://perma.cc/TC5F-V9E6]. Regarding the political focus on
courts, see supra note 7; and on academic treatments, see supra note 4.
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threat to separation of powers, and an incentive for forum shopping. 32

By contrast, my political-context account asks what external factors might explain the judiciary's behavior with respect to
the nationwide injunction. Unlike the court-centered account,
my political-context account does not turn inward toward doctrine, but rather turns outward to the disputes that seem to have
given rise to the deployment of the nationwide injunction-specifically the legitimacy of unilateral presidential action-and
asks whether understanding that phenomenon might give us
better insight into the nationwide injunction.
A.

The Court-CenteredAccount of the Nationwide
Injunction

The court-centered account is a common launchpad for critiques of the nationwide injunction. Scholars have criticized the
use of nationwide injunctions as a brand of de facto class action
that fails to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's processes for expanding the scope and remedial authority of courts
tasked with adjudicating systemic disputes. 3 3 Other scholars
have defended nationwide injunctions as consistent with the judiciary's equitable remedial authority and cite Article III's constraints on the judiciary as a mitigating factor. 34
What unites these accounts of the nationwide injunction is
their focus on courts alone. Under the court-centered account,
courts are the only important institution for understanding, critiquing, and defending the nationwide injunction. The challenge
begins with the nationwide injunction. The challenge is resolved
with arguments for bringing courts back in line, or, conversely,
justifying the precedents and rationales for these courts' behaviors. 3 5
32. See supra note 4. But see Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the "Universal"
Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020) (deploying a court-centered account of the
nationwide (universal) injunction to challenge accounts that it is inconsistent with
Article III).
33. See Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 9; Morley, De Facto Class
Actions, supra note 9.
34. See Frost, supra note 4.
35. For example, Frost's defense of the nationwide injunction relies on a broad
reading of judicial power and expansive remedial authority. She writes, "No rule
has ever barred courts from issuing injunctions controlling a defendant's conduct
vis-a-vis nonparties." Id. at 1080. On the standing issue, she writes, "[Uinder some
circumstances courts allow individuals who themselves have no injury to proceed
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In the most ambitious attempt to provide a historical account of the nationwide injunction, Samuel Bray suggests that
it is a child of the emergence of the administrative state, and he
identifies its initial growth in cases involving agency action. 36 In
his explanation of why the nationwide injunction emerged, however, Professor Bray asserts that there was a convergence of
(1) the division of judicial authority that was once exercised by a
single actor in the older English practice with (2) conceptual
transformations that saw suits against the state as offensive
tools rather than merely defensive tools, and a change in what
it meant to successfully challenge state authority from non-application of a law in a particular context, to a broader invalidation of a law. 3 7

Bray asserts that rise of a federal judiciary with multiple,
coequal judicial decisionmakers-what he calls "multiple Chancellors"3 8-set the stage for the nationwide injunction, despite
the fact that the divided federal judiciary emerged over 150
years prior to the nationwide injunction's emergence. 3 9 He argues that the rise of multiple chancellors could not, by itself, explain the rise of the nationwide injunction. 40 To Bray, the necessary elements first included a change in the conception of
litigation against the government as a suit against the government's enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute-a
defensive suit-to a conception of such a challenge in more offensive terms, allowing for suits even where enforcement was

with litigation, which further suggests that courts have the power to issue remedies
that extend beyond the plaintiffs actual injuries." Id. at 1083. Even Frost's larger
separation-of-powers defense is aimed at justifying the judicial role in serving as a
"check on the political branches." Id. at 1088.
36. Bray, supra note 4.
37. Id. at 445.
38. The rise of several federal district courts with identical equitable authority
rather than the concentration of such authority in a single actor created the
structural possibility for variation and conflict.
39. Id. at 445-48. Here, Bray means that the federal judiciary abandoned the
"one-chancellor" structure that unified the equitable authority within a single
institutional actor. By creating multiple chancellors and endowing them with
equitable authority in the late eighteenth century, the United States made "every
judge ...
a Chancellor," capable of delivering equitable relief. Id. Under such a
structure, the nationwide injunction could raise problems not seen in a system of a
single Chancellor. But Bray himself does not identify the initial nationwide
injunction as emerging until at least after World War II. See id. at 445.
40. Id. at 449 ("With enough judicial restraint or certain ideological views about
courts and law, the vulnerabilities of the multiple-chancellor structure would not
have been exposed.").
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not threatened. 4 1 Bray suggests that the Declaratory Judgment
Act may have been the source of change in this way of thinking
about suits against the government. 4 2 The necessary elements
also included a change in the way judges thought about the task
of adjudicating a constitutional challenge to a law. 4 3 The judiciary once saw invalidation of a law as refusing to apply it to the
specific parties to the dispute. Bray argues that this narrow conception gave way to a broader conception of invalidation of the
statute, which had more general applicability. 4 4 This transformation seemingly expanded the consequences of a judicial inval45
idation, including the court's subsequent remedial authority.
Thus, Bray's framing and historical accounts of the rise of the
nationwide injunction tell a story about the development of the
rules of civil procedure, remedial authority, the scope of Article
III, constitutional litigation, and how judges invalidate laws.
But this court-centered account does not tell us much else.
Nationwide injunctions impact controversies that have made
their way to not only courts but also the front pages of websites
and newspapers. Nonetheless, court-centered accounts seem divorced from an understanding of courts as institutions embed46
ded within a larger political ecology. Ignoring the political en-

vironment may also obscure critical dimensions of nationwide
injunctions that we ought not to miss. Court-centered accounts
see the emergence of the nationwide injunction as the consequence of changing ideological and conceptual capacities of
courts, without much explanation of why these capacities have
been deployed recently. 47 Again, what circumstances provide for
the convergence of these institutional ingredients-including
multiple judicial actors, expansive conception of judicial role,

41. Id. at 449-52.
42. Id. at 450.
43. Id. at 451-52.
44. Id. at 451.
45. While Bray mentions other factors that this Essay suggests are likely to
offer better explanations about the timing of the surge in nationwide injunctions,
including the increase in agency rulemaking, these appear to be less central factors
in his analysis. Id. at 452-53. See also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 336 (asserting
that nationwide injunctions find their roots in a transformation in the conception
of constitutional litigation, which now entails such litigation as giving a court the
authority to invalidate the law at issue rather than an older conception of
constitutional litigation that understood invalidity as merely a decision not to apply
a particular law to a particular party).
46. See discussion supra note 5.
47. See sources cited supra note 4.

802

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

and expansive conception of litigation against the governmentto give rise to the nationwide injunction?
Bray identifies the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision as
the basis for expanded conceptions of the judicial role when resolving public disputes, and traces the emergence of nationwide
injunctions accordingly. 4 8 Under these accounts, Brown is depicted as based, at least in part, on changing conceptions of the
Court's responsibility to African Americans during the Jim Crow
era. 4 9 What these accounts seem to ignore is the larger institutional context in which the Court decided Brown.5 0 The Court
rendered its decision in a context that included some public support-at least in the North-and significant backing within the
executive branch, which submitted a brief in favor of the plaintiffs' petition. 5 1
This is not to say that ideological or conceptual transformations within the Court did not assist in bringing about its de48. Bray, supra note 4, at 455 ("The moral rightness of the desegregation cases
seemingly reshaped federal judges' self-conception of their remedial role. After the
Brown era, judges became more willing to give commands to federal and state
officers.").
49. For a discussion of increased judicial solicitude for minority rights
protection, see Robert Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1316 (1982) ("The critical importance of Brown v.
Board of Education was that it removed any doubt about the Court's commitment
to [rewrite the Constitution]-whatever its implications.").
50. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980):
I contend that the decision in Brown to break with the Court's long-held
position on these issues cannot be understood without some consideration
of the decision's value to whites, not simply those concerned about the
immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policymaking
positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and
abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation. First, the decision
helped to provide immediate credibility to America's struggle with
Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world
peoples. At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for both the
NAACP and the federal government.
See also, MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011).
51. See, e.g., KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: How
THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 4 (2004) (arguing that Brown is a
"byproduct[] of an institutional mission ... that was significantly shaped by . .. the
'judicial policy' of the Roosevelt administration, a policy that was itself a
consequence of FDR's management of divisions within the Democratic Party and
his construction of the modern presidency"). See also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 106 (1993) (arguing that Brown advanced "the political preferences of the
durable majority whose interests were represented on the Brown Supreme Court").
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cision. But the Court clearly was attuned to how its decision
would be received by other American institutions. This point is
supported by the Court's refusal to entertain an appeal from the
Virginia Supreme Court challenging the state's ban on interracial marriage in the wake of Brown. In Naim v. Naim, the Court
squarely faced a constitutional challenge to Virginia's antimiscegenation law. 5 2 Despite the fact that the case seemed to
fall within the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, 5 3 the Court maneuvered to delay, and ultimately deny, exercising jurisdiction
over the dispute. 54 Accounts of the Court's treatment of the appeal suggest that the Court feared a reaction by whites-both in
and out of the South-so soon after its decision in Brown. It is
reported that Justice Clark supported the Court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction saying, "[O]ne bombshell at a time is
enough." 5 5 That "bombshell," of course, was Brown.
The Brown decision was not merely a decision that involved
the Court's evolution on the question of its role in protecting minority rights, or its conclusion that it had the capacity and authority to undertake such a task. Brown also involved a calculus
about how the Court's decision would impact the wider institutional environment. 5 6 Similarly, ideological and conceptual ex52. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
53. The Court's mandatory jurisdiction at the time required the Court to
entertain appeals from state courts where the state court had ruled against a
federal right. In Naim, the Virginia court upheld a state law against a federal
constitutional challenge. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 22-23
(Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 7th ed. 2017).
54. The Court initially vacated the state's decision upholding the antimiscegenation statute on the ground that the record was inadequate. Naim v.
Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). On remand, Virginia's highest court essentially ignored
the Court's voiding of its initial decision and upheld the anti-miscegenation statute
again. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956). In the Supreme Court a second
time, the Court held that the Virginia decision "leaves the case devoid of a properly
presented federal question." Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). Commentators
have described the Court's decision as a strategic dodge of a conflict with the postBrown south. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 323 (2004) ("A majority
of the justices apparently preferred to be humiliated at the hands of truculent state
jurists rather than to stoke further the fires of racial controversy.").
55. Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEVADA L.J. 525, 526 (2012) (citing to
LUCAS POWE, JR., ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964)).
56. See generally ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 276 (1992)
(describing the Warren Court's awareness that majoritarian institutions had not
resolved the question of de jure racial segregation and its determination that the
federal judiciary-primarily, federal district courts-might serve a role in
advancing an "institutional means for inducing the racial antagonists to engage in
reasoned inquiry").
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planations are insufficient to explain the emergence of the nationwide injunction. To the extent that such injunctions are
expenditures of institutional capital, an important question
must be: Under what conditions is the issuance of nationwide
injunctions an institutionally rational choice? The circumstances under which resort to the nationwide injunction might
be institutionally rational for the judicial actor likely are not determined by doctrinal niceties, but by political contexts.
This Essay invites us to confront the prospect that the nationwide injunction is a rational institutional response to
increasing assertions of unilateral presidential authority, which
are incentivized and immunized by increased legislative gridlock. The court-centered account obscures this analysis; my
political-context account brings it into focus.
And partisans may indeed find political (and principled)
reasons to support nationwide injunctions. During congressional
hearings on nationwide injunctions at which three of the leading
scholars on the nationwide injunction were called to testify,
there was clearly a partisan divide. 5 7 For example, Representative Jerrold Nadler, the then-ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, pressed Professor Amanda Frost to declare
that the Supreme Court had "in effect upheld the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions" 5 8 in contrast with Bray's assertion
that those injunctions lacked the justices' approval. Nadler then
pressed Bray on whether the Court had implicitly upheld the
nationwide injunction in Trump v. Hawaii5 9 when it decided to
stay the injunction on the travel ban.60
Representative Goodlatte, also revealing his partisan leanings, challenged Frost's assertion that Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) was invalidated by a nationwide injunction. 6 1 He declared, "[I]n the DAPA case what the court
actually found was a violation of the APA. That was something
that was not asserted in the lawsuits against the travel orders.
And there is a difference there." 6 2
57. Samuel Bray, Amanda Frost, and Michael Morley were invited to testify in
a congressional hearing. See The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by
District Courts Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).
58. Id.
59. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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To the extent that Republican members sought to defend
specific nationwide injunctions, they endeavored to distinguish
them from other nationwide injunctions in ways that would have
legitimized the issuance of injunctions against the Obama Administration, while still calling into question the legitimacy of
injunctions issued against the Trump Administration. 6 3 And
Nadler, whose party was in the minority in the House and Senate and was out of the White House, seemed willing to accept the
legitimacy of the nationwide injunction. 6 4
That Nadler is willing to accept these judicial tools, at least
while a Republican is in the White House, should not be ignored
when we are thinking about the decision of federal judges to issue nationwide injunctions. In fact, it proves my political-context
account is the more valuable lens for analyzing nationwide injunctions.
B. The Political-ContextAccount of the Nationwide
Injunction

-

There is much to admire about the court-centered account
of the emergence of the nationwide injunction. It provides us
with an account of institutional capacity-both conceptual and
legal-that empowers courts to see themselves as endowed with
the authority to issue nationwide injunctions. And the court-centered account contributes to answering the question of how institutions accrete new forms of power, which is an enduring
question in institutional analysis.
That said, the court-centered account does not appear sufficient to answer the question of why a court might choose to deploy a nationwide injunction at a particular point in time. Institutional persistence is inconsistent with an institution
recklessly deploying institutional capital. The court-centered account's explanation appears to assume that the judiciary-with
65
its doctrines designed to preserve institutional resources
63.

Id.

64. Suzanne Monyak, House Panel Advances Bill to Bar Nationwide
Injunctions, LAW360 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.1aw360.comlarticles/1082785
(last visited Nov. 12,
/house-panel-advances-bill-to-bar-nationwide-injunctions
2019) [https://perma.cc/MYK8-RVPBI (highlighting that Nadler criticized the
legislation on the ground that it would "inject confusion and needless barriers to
relief into the legal system").
65. The judicial conservation of resources is exemplified most prominently in
the prudential standing and political question doctrines, to name two. See Rucho v.
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would spend capital in ways that do not conform to some sense
of rational preservation. This makes it important to understand
why deployment of the national injunction would make sense for
an institution committed to preserving its capital. The literature's attempt to explain this by reference to Brown's impact on
judicial institutions is likely inadequate in at least one important respect. If we accept the impact that the Brown era had
on the conceptualization of the role of courts, why does today's
era, which appears to have abandoned other core Brown-era tenets, 6 6 continue to be under this case's sway? What makes a practice, the rise of which is explained as being at least partially
rooted in Brown, emerge with such increased use today?
For a partial answer, I return to those factors that seemed
to have been moved to the margins (noted as "Other Changes"
by Bray), especially the rise of the administrative state and increased administrative lawmaking. 6 7 Judicial precedent appears to confirm that a successful challenge to agency action can
enjoin the agency's application of the regulation even against
nonparties. 6 8

Make the Road New York v. McAleenan 6 9 is such an example. In this 2019 district court decision setting aside the Trump
Administration's expedited removal regulation, 7 0 the judge issued a nationwide injunction over the objections of the Depart-

Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over claims
of partisan gerrymandering as political questions); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving "generalized
grievances").
66. For examples of departures from the Brown era, see Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating section 4 of the Voting Rights Act as
violative of federalism principles); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)
(overruling the district court, which mandated busing to remedy de facto segregated
schools). Indeed, even so-called liberal judges who people the judiciary likely do not
see Brown as the paradigmatic example of judging. See Neil A. Lewis, In Picking
Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/01/us/in-selecting-federal-judges-clinton-hasnot-tried-to-reverse-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/TE5D-E6AK] ("[W]hat may
be most notable about Mr. Clinton's judicial appointments may be reluctance to fill
the courts with liberal judges.").
67. Bray, supra note 4, at 452.
68. See, e.g., Nat' Mining Ass'n. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'r, 145 F.3d 1399,
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (vacating rule as universally applicable, not simply applicable
to individual petitioners) (referencing Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 496

(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
69. 405 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019).
70.
2019).

Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 23,
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ment of Homeland Security (DHS), in part on the ground that
DHS's objection to the issuance of a nationwide injunction would
"simultaneously enlargel agency power and undercut[| judicial
authority .... 71 The justification by the district court in Make
the Road also suggests that while the court is specifically addressing a question of agency promulgation of immigration policy without undertaking notice-and-comment rulemaking-a
paradigmatic form of unilateral executive action-the court
seems to also see itself as maintaining a system-wide balance of
power.
Thus, justification of the nationwide injunction sounds in
two registers, namely: (1) the ordinary register of precedent regarding judicial invalidation of unlawful agency action; and
(2) the "higher" register regarding the judiciary's role in checking the executive's use (or abuse) of authority. In Make the Road,
the district court clearly had a conception of what it meant to
invalidate a federal agency action that came close to a court-centered account. But the district court made explicit that which
appears to be implicit in Wasserman and Bray's accountnamely that the conception is grounded in a concern about an
overreaching executive branch-saying that:
[B]ecause our constitutional system clearly contemplates
that the judiciary will have the power to check the conduct of
executive branch officials who violate the law, [the assertion]
that the agency should be deemed to have the unfettered ability to carry on with respect to pronounced unlawful behavior
...

is quite troubling. 72

This seems different, at least in degree, from an undifferentiated concern about litigation against the government. Here,
the district court emphasized actions by the executive branch
that are a key component to our understanding of the recent upsurge in nationwide injunctions.
Though "judicial activism" of the sort engaged in by the
Brown-era courts may no longer be in fashion, judicial activism
to preserve federalism or separation-of-powers values defines to-

71. Make the Road New York v. Kevin McAleenan, No. 19-cv-2369 (KBJ), 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166944, at *166 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019).
72. Id. at *167.
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day's jurisprudential era. 7 3 But what makes this era one in
which federalism or separation-of-powers values are threatened? The following Part argues that the rise in unilateral presidential power in response to a gridlocked Congress might be the
threat underwriting judicial resort to the nationwide injunction.
III. EXPLORING THE POLITICAL-CONTEXT ACCOUNT: AN
IMPOTENT CONGRESS AND AN EMPOWERED EXECUTIVE

The political-context account of the surge and transformation of the nationwide injunction into a tool of partisan warfare requires us to think about the larger political landscape in
which resort to such a tool becomes possible. Situating nationwide injunctions in a larger ecology decenters the injunction as
a singularly aberrant practice.
The political-context account avoids an exclusive focus on
what a single district court does in its responsive capacity. Rather, it focuses on the how the injunction fits within a larger set
of pathologies in the American political landscape. Critics of the
nationwide injunction dwell on the risks that it poses for American democracy. 74 One advantage of my political-context account
is that those risks are capable of being assessed alongside the
risks that are posed by unchecked unilateral presidential action,
thereby avoiding a truncated decision-making process where the
nationwide injunction is viewed in isolation. Therefore, the political context is congressional gridlock underwritten by partisan
polarization and fragile control in Congress, along with unilateral presidential actions responding to congressional inaction.

73.
See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
(invalidating the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion and Individual
Mandate provisions on federalism grounds); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Oversight
Accounting Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (invalidating the removal provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for encroaching on presidential removal authority).
74. Critics of the nationwide injunction contend that its use politicizes the
judiciary, undermines constitutional constraints on the judiciary, and undermines
incentives for political compromise. See Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions'
Governance Problems 28-38 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University
of Colorado Law Review); see also Barr, supra note 2.
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A. PartisanPolarizationin Congress
The existence and scope of partisan polarization in Congress
has become one of the most studied issues in American politics. 7 5
It is described as the source of the gridlock in government and of
the distrust and apathy about government that shapes the current political era. 76 The contemporary polarization of the political parties is often described as having its roots in the 1970s
when the Republican and Democratic parties began to move further apart on the ideological continuum. 7 7 Statistical studies of
Congress demonstrate that from the 1970s, the parties began to
diverge as the Democratic Party became more liberal and the
Republican Party became more conservative. 7 8
Measures of increasing partisan polarization in Congress
are present in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. From about 1985 to the present, the ideological divergence
of the parties in the House of Representatives resulted from leftward drift within the Democratic Party's membership and, more
significantly, from a substantial rightward shift in the Republican Party's membership. 7 9
Ideological position scores are illustrative. 8 0 For example,
the average Democratic member of the House of Representatives
75.

In the last several years, a number of books have been published examining

the phenomenon. See, e.g., SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS: THE POSTWAR

ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA (2017); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY
POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); DANIELLE THOMSEN, OPTING OUT OF
CONGRESS: PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF MODERATE CANDIDATES
(2018).

76. David R. Jones, Declining Trust in Congress: Effects of Polarization and
Consequences for Democracy, 13 FORUM 375, 383-88 (2015) (finding that
congressional polarization, and its attendant effects on Congress's capacity to
respond to problems, has negatively affected the level of public trust).
77. Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarizationof Contemporary
American Politics, 46 POLITY 411, 415 (2014).

78. Id.
79. Keith T. Poole, The Roots of Polarization of Modern U.S. Politics 32
(September 8, 2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with the University of Colorado
Law Review) ("Republicans have moved steadily to the right on the liberalconservative dimension with conservatives replacing moderate and conservative
Democrats in the South.").
80. Ideological position scores are constructed on the basis of actual votes taken
in Congress. Using a method called DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted
NOMINAl Three-step Estimation), which is a scaling procedure developed in the
1980s by political science professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, legislators
are "mapped" based on their voting history and placed in proximity to one another
on the basis of such votes. The map understands ideological variation based on
distance on the map arranged according to a liberal-conservative axis and another
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in 1959 had an ideological position score of -0.245.81 By way of
context, the Democratic score is measured between 0 and -1,
with -1 being the most liberal. 8 2 In 2015, the same score
was -0.384, likely the most liberal score recorded since at least
1947.83 By contrast, the average Republican member of the
House in 1959 had an ideological position score of 0.221, with
the Republican score measured between 0 and 1, with 1 being
the most conservative ideological position. 8 4 In 2015 that same
score was 0.693, the second most conservative score since at
least 1947.85
Similar shifts can be seen in the Senate. In 1959, the average Democratic senator's ideological position was -0.229, while
the average Republican position was 0.24.86 In 2015, the
average ideological position of a Democratic senator was -0.388,
while the corresponding score for an average Republican Senator was 0.551.87 In short, both houses of Congress became far
more polarized.
Explanations of the increase in political polarization during
the latter half of the twentieth century have been varied. Hare
and Poole argue that the migration of white southerners from
the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, after the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s, resulted in a "more homogeneously liberal" Democratic Party and a more conservative Republican Party. 88 Poole measures the current partisan landscape by
examining the 108th House of Representatives (2003-05) as two
ideologically distinct clusters made up of largely Democrats (regardless of region) and Republicans. 8 9 He reports that there is
virtually no overlap between Democrats and Republicans from
an ideological perspective, as compared to earlier periods. 90
axis on significant political issues in American history, including slavery, currency,
nativism, civil rights, and lifestyle issues. See About the Project, VOTEVIEW.COM,
https://voteview.com/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6XVGBH99].
81. THE BROOKINGS INST., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS: DATA ON THE U.S.
CONGRESS,
18 (2019), https://www.brookings.eduwp-content/uploads/2017/01

/vitalstatsch8_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNX4-4CNM].
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id. at 40.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Hare & Poole, supra note 77, at 416.
89. Poole, supra note 79, at 33.
90.

Id. at 38.
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Hare and Poole also argue that the Republican Party's shift to
the right cannot be totally explained by an infusion of conservative Southern voters but by the move by conservative voters
across the country into the Republican Party. 9 1 They contend
that conservative activists and party-aligned interest groups
also aided the Republican Party's rightward movement. 9 2
While commentators seem to identify the effects of partisan
polarization as having started in the 1970s, polarization is likely
the effect of partisan sorting that slowly increased over time. 9 3
Despite the popular identification of the Civil Rights Movement
as the impetus for realignment, the roots likely also lie in the
New Deal era. 9 4 That period is important to our polarization
narrative because it established a trajectory that sorted the political parties as more coherently liberal or conservative on social
and economic issues. 9 5
One of the most significant consequences of the New Deal's
transformation of the American political system is the political
alliance that developed between the Democratic Party and labor. 9 6 Political scientist Tracey Roof reports that the labor movement was not part of Franklin Roosevelt's original electoral coalition, despite Roosevelt's appeal to working class voters. 9 7
Historian Lizabeth Cohen reports that workers in the pre-New
Deal era were largely disconnected from the state and saw their

91.

Hare & Poole, supra note 77, at 417.

92.

Id.

93. Partisan sorting is the phenomenon by which the two major political parties
have become increasingly ideologically pure. This has involved the disappearance
of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats from the parties' respective
coalitions.
94. Hare & Poole, supra note 77, at 415 (arguing that while the modern roots
of southern white secession from the Democratic Party are a result of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the ideological divergence of
the two parties on economic and social issues trace back to the New Deal
reconfiguration of the Democratic Party coalition).
95. See ERIC SCHICKLER, RACIAL REALIGNMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1932-1965 (2016) (arguing that the incorporation of
organized labor and blacks into the Democratic Party had the effect of making the
Party a reliably liberal one on both economic and racial issues). The creation of
more ideologically "pure" parties has been offered as an explanation for why
partisan polarization today is different from other eras of polarization of political
parties. See MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: How LIBERALS BECAME
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009).
96. TRACY ROOF, AMERICAN LABOR, CONGRESS, AND THE WELFARE STATE,
1935-2010, at 22-23 (2011) (discussing the New Deal era's incorporation of the
American labor movement into the Democratic Party coalition).
97. Id. at 22-25.
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fates as dominated by the ties to their employers through "welfare capitalism." 9 8 The New Deal's inauguration of a social welfare state independent of private business (at least to some extent) transformed workers' relationships to the state and their
expectations of it.99
Cohen describes a largely unorganized working class at the
dawn of the New Deal. 100 This would begin to change when the
state moved into the employment relationship between workers
and employers. 101 Beginning with the largely uneven efforts of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, the national government
attempted to regularize worker wages and hours by encouraging
employers to voluntarily set minimum wages and maximum
hours. 102 Despite the policy's mixed results, Cohen argues that
the National Industrial Recovery Act "probably did more to
heighten worker awareness that government could, and should,
intervene in the private sector" than it achieved in substantive
economic benefits for workers. 103 Indeed, political scientist Eric
Schickler argues that the coalition between labor and the Democratic Party helped to move the party leftward on civil rights
and incorporate blacks into the Democratic Party, which also
laid the foundation for events in the mid-1960s. 10 4
Whatever the causes of increases in partisan polarization in
Congress, there are significant consequences for that institution's ability to address the challenges of American governance
on a host of issues facing the country. 105 This ought to be under98.

LIZABETH COHEN,

MAKING

A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL

WORKERS IN

CHICAGO, 1919-1939, at 267 (2008). Welfare capitalism was a mix of employer and
voluntary associations that provided limited support for workers' needs. Cohen
reports that the Great Depression had undermined these traditional bases of
support, making the rise of the welfare state that much more important for workers
in 1930s Chicago. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 254-55. Cohen describes a "disinterest in government" (at least at the
national level) by the working class of Chicago in the era leading to the Great
Depression.
101. Id. at 277-78.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SCHICKLER, supra note 95, at 94-96 (describing the fight for fair
employment practices legislation as bringing unions and blacks together in the
fight for civil rights).
105. Sarah Binder, How Political Polarization Creates Stalemate and
Undermines Lawmaking,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
13,
2014),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/13/how-politicalpolarization-creates-stalemate-and-undermines-lawmaking/?arc404-true
[https://
perma.ccIW4LS-B6V5] ("[T]he frequency of legislative deadlock increases as the
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standable to those familiar with the extant discussions of "vetogates," or hurdles to legislative passage, in American politics. 106
The United States Constitution requires that legislation (1) be
approved by at least a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; and (2) approved by the President
through his signing the legislation into law. 107 The Constitution
allows an override of the President's veto-or decision not to give
his approval to enacted legislation-by empowering a two-thirds
supermajority to override the President's veto of enacted legislation.1 0 8 Beyond the Constitution, the Senate's procedural rules
allow for the filibuster of legislation and, until recently, presidential appointments, thereby empowering Senate minorities to
block legislative enactments. 109 When one also considers the authority of legislative committees within the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the authority with which party leaders in each chamber of Congress are endowed, the institutional
hurdles to legislative enactment are even more complex.11 0 The
institutional environment in which legislation is enacted increases the value of building a "big tent" to achieve legislative
See also SARAH BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND
parties polarize.").
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 97 (2003) [hereinafter BINDER,
STALEMATE] (finding that the greater the partisan polarization there was on an
issue, the less likely it was to be enacted by the Senate, while partisan polarization
had less impact on outcomes in the House of Representatives).
106. William N. Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J. LAW,
ECON., & ORG. 756, 757-61 (2015) (discussing the many points in the legislative
process where legislation may be killed). Vetogates include: (1) legislative
committees or subcommittees that may fail to report a bill to the full House or
Senate; (2) the filibuster in the Senate, which can prevent a bill from obtaining an
"up or down" vote; (3) an up or down vote in the full chamber; and (4) the
presidential veto.
107. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
108. Id. at cl. 3.
109. The Senate's cloture rule cuts off debate, which is unlimited in the Senate.
The present cloture rule requires sixty votes. COMMITTEE ON RULES AND
ADMINISTRATION, 113th CONG., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE No. 113-18 15-16
(Comm. Prin. 2013).
110. For example, Sarah Binder explained that the control that the majority
party has over the Rules Committee in the House of Representatives, which has a
significant role in shaping whether, and under what circumstances, a bill will come
up for a vote by the full House, impacts the sorts of legislation that are voted on.
Party leaders in Congress often avoid bringing legislation up for a vote where there
is not a majority of the party coalition in favor, even where there is sufficient
bipartisan support to enact the legislation. Binder states that this often leads to
more partisan legislation being voted on in the House, which will have a difficult
time overcoming hurdles like the filibuster in the Senate. This leads to inaction on
issues where there is partisan polarization. See BINDER, STALEMATE, supra note
105, at 97.
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enactment. To the extent that partisan polarization makes it difficult to create the "big tent," the less productive the legislative
process will be.
Partisan polarization makes it more difficult for Congress to
enact legislation because it exacerbates the institutional hurdles
that make legislating so challenging. The inability of legislators
to reach sufficient consensus on legislative priorities leaves a
hole in our policy landscape. Given the incentives that drive
presidential behavior--enacting policy priorities, building a record of policy achievement to satisfy constituents to enhance both
the President's reelection chances and his party's political reputation, and building a legacy of accomplishment for posterityPresidents faced with the burdens of legislative institutions are
further incentivized to take unilateral action. 1 1 1 But polarization alone may not fully explain the underlying causes or scope
of legislative paralysis or the legislative inability to respond to
presidential attempts to fill the policy landscape. Alongside ideologically polarized parties are increasingly fragile majorities
that also undermine congressional action.
B. The Insecure Majority and Congressional
Nongovernance
Partisan polarization alone may not fully explain legislative
gridlock. Political scientist Frances Lee highlights the role
played by what she calls the "insecure majority" as an explanatory factor in legislative inefficacy. 1 12 To Lee, this means that
when the two major political parties in Congress are in a competitive condition in which the next election cycle could change
the party in control of the legislative branch, there is less incentive for the minority party to cooperate with the majority
party. 1 1 3 She argues that under such conditions, political parties
neglect the work of "legislating" in favor of "messaging" strate-

111.

Ed O'Keefe, The House Has Voted 54 Times in Four Years on Obamacare.

Here's the

Full

List,

WASH.

POST

(Mar.

21,

2014,

8:06

AM),

https://

www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/21/the-house-has-voted-54times-in-four-years-on-obamacare-heres-the-full-list/
[https://perma.cc/89QVTLLV].
112. FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL
CAMPAIGN 8-10 (2016).

113. Id. at 41 ("[I]ncreased competition for control of Congress fuels a more
confrontational style of partisanship, as parties in their quest for power seek to
define the stakes for voters.").
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gies that are intended to "draw clear contrasts with the opposition" for electoral gain. 1 14 Lee contends that partisan polarization combined with interparty competition for control of
the Congress creates the conditions that lead to legislative gridlock. 1 15 Lee also asserts that since the 1980s, when Republicans
ousted Democrats from the Senate majority, "the two parties
compete for control of Congress at relative parity." 1 1 6 The threat
that either the majority party will lose control of the chamber or
that the minority party will gain control of one or both chambers
impacts the incentive structure within any session of Congress.
Lee compares this to an earlier period (1955-81) during
which the Democrats possessed nearly insurmountable control
over Congress. 1 17 For example, from the 87th Congress (196163) until they lost control of the Senate in 1981, the Democrats
held no fewer than fifty-four seats in the Senate. 1 18 Over the
same period, Democrats held no fewer than 243 seats in the
House. 1 1 9 Indeed, even with the election and reelection of
Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984, the Democrats held 243 and
254 seats, respectively. 12 0 The House that was elected along
with George Bush Sr.'s defeat of Michael Dukakis saw the Democrats increase their control over the House of Representatives
from 258 to 260 seats for the Congress starting in 1989.121 And
the era of Democratic Party dominance in the House of Representatives lasted from 1955 to 1994.122
But in the post-1980 period, control of the Senate changed
seven times, while control of the House changed three times
since the 1994 elections. 12 3 It is increasingly reasonable for
114. Id. at 49.
115. Id. at 48-49 ("Drawing clear lines between the parties stands at odds with
the conciliatory efforts that are typically necessary to legislate. . . . Bipartisanship
participation in legislating, however, undercuts party messaging efforts.").
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 21.
118. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
[https://perma.cclTCV6-LGLQ] [hereinafter U.S. Senate Party Division].
119. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, HIST., ART
& ARCHIVES - U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov
/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/5SHS-PAPC].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Majority Changes in the House of Representatives, 1856 to Present, HIST.
ART & ARCHIVES - U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov
[https://perma.cclTKH4-H24].
/Institution/Majority-Changes/Majority-Changes/
Control of the House of Representatives shifted between the parties in 2007, 2011,
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members of the minority party to believe that their turn at control of the legislative chamber will come sooner rather than
later. Under such circumstances, the willingness of political minorities to accept suboptimal policy solutions is tempered by a
desire to simply control the chamber instead. Rather than participating in the project of legislating and governance, minority
party actors are inclined to believe that the next election cycle
carries the potential to regain the majority. And as stated above,
the operating rules of the House and Senate place significant
power in the hands of the majority party to control the legislative
agenda through the control of House and Senate Committee
chairmanships, among other powers. 124
These structural incentives combine with increasingly insecure and unstable majority control to produce behaviors that undermine collaboration between the two major political parties,
thereby exacerbating the polarized environment and furthering
legislative gridlock. As stated above, this gridlock leaves holes
in the policy landscape that might go unfilled or are increasingly
likely to be filled by Presidents who refuse to countenance a
threat to their capacity to achieve policy and electoral ambitions
simply because Congress is unable to legislate.
C. A Partisan,Polarized, and Impotent Congress in a
System of SeparatedPowers
In Federalist 51, James Madison assumed that the legislative branch would be the dominant branch in governance and
that it would be the branch of government most likely to encroach upon other branches. 1 2 5 But under the conditions discussed above, Congress has seemingly relinquished its role as
the dominant force in American governance.
Congress's failure to legislate leaves a policy vacuum that
puts the President at risk of not achieving important policy
agenda items for his electoral coalition-thereby increasing the
and 2019. U.S. Senate PartyDivision, supra note 118. Control of the United States
Senate shifted in 1995, four times between 2001 and 2002, 2007, and 2015. Id.
124. See, e.g., GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA:
RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 21
(2005) ("Key to our approach was the assumption that majority status confers
substantial benefits. In particular, advancement to committee chairs and other key
posts in the House is possible only if one's party gains a majority, and advancement
of one's legislative projects is greatly facilitated by majority status.").
125. Id. at 350.
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likelihood that the executive will undertake unilateral action. 1 2 6
Evidence of the decline of legislative activity in Congress
abounds. A recent study by ProPublica and the Washington Post
found that "as recently as 2005 and 2006," House Committees
met 449 times regarding legislation and Senate Committees met
252 times. A decade later, those numbers had fallen to 254 and
69, respectively.1 2 7 Since the 100th Congress (1987-89), Congress enacted fewer than 100 substantive laws on eight occasions. 1 2 8 Six of those eight periods of inactivity fell during the
last six Congresses (2007-present).1 29
The 112th (2011-13) and 113th (2013-15) Congresses set
records over this period for legislative futility, enacting sixtythree and sixty-one substantive pieces of legislation, respectively. 1 3 0 Congress's legislative inefficacy, which reached historic levels in the Obama Administration, is likely related to
Obama's increased use of unilateral action. Although statistics
demonstrate that Obama did not employ executive orders any
more than his immediate predecessors-Obama issued 295 executive orders compared to George W. Bush's 294 and Bill Clinton's 290-Obama appears to have relied on other unilateral
policy devices far more aggressively than previous Presidents
had. 13 1 These primarily included executive memoranda, which
Years of
126. Gregory Korte, For Obama, Fewer Bill-Signing Ceremonies Reflect
6 2
2
Gridlock, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 01 /1 /13
953528 6
updated
(last
0
/president-obama-fewer-bill-signing-ceremonies-gridlock/
Dec. 13, 2016, 3:57 PM) [https://perma.cc/R6B9-RBUD] (highlighting that at 60 billsiging ceremonies, Obama had fewer than his three predecessors who served two
terms-Reagan (61), Clinton (91), and Bush (95)-and instead increased the use of
presidential memoranda).
127. Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA
(Nov. 5, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stoppedworking [https://perma.cc/QJ7N-8NLY].
128. The Pew Research Center defines "substantive" laws to mean those laws
that result in a change in federal law or authorizes an expenditure of taxpayer
dollars. They are contrasted with ceremonial legislation, which include laws that
rename buildings, award medals, or memorialize historic events. Share of
Substantive Laws Passed by Congress Has Varied Over Time, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity[https://
scorecard-for-1 15th-congress/ft_19-01-23_congressproductivity1ine/
perma.cc/4WGE-ZUE6].
129. Three Decades of Congressional Productivity, 1987-2017, PEW RESEARCH
2
CTR. (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/ 5/aproductivity-scorecard-for- 11 5th-congress/ft_18-01-09_congressproductivity/
[https://perma.cc/L5D2-77RD].
130. Id.
USA
131. Gregory Korte, Obama Issues 'Executive Orders by Another Name',
4 2
2
TODAY (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 01 /1 /16
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132

For example, in
2014, Obama issued a memorandum titled, "Updating and Modernizing Overtime Regulations," which called for expanding coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime requirements
to include "white collar" workers. 13 3 This was subsequently
promulgated in a rulemaking by the Department of Labor. 134
In an era of insecure majorities and partisan polarization,
Congress's ability to protect its institutional interests against
usurpation often takes a back seat. Frances Lee highlights the
behavior of minority parties in Congress when the President is
a member of their political party. 135 While Lee asserts that those
minority parties will work harder to produce policy results as
compared to when the presidency is held by the opposition party,
the minority party's efforts are primarily aimed at "supporting
the president's initiatives." 1 3 6 But this incentive is not shared
by the majority party in a divided government. The
congressional majority faced with a President of the opposing
party is more likely to try to establish points of contrast with the
sitting President of the other party, rather than seek legislative
directed agencies how to carry out policy.

outputs. 137 Under these circumstances, even efforts to protect

the institutional interests of Congress against executive
usurpation are likely to be seen as driven by partisanship, rather
than by genuine concern about the institution's prerogatives if

/obama-presidential-memoranda-executive-orders/20191805/
[https://perma.cc
/N2QZ-5LBG] (arguing that Obama had used more presidential memoranda than
previous Presidents, even as the number of executive orders was in line with other
Presidents).

132.

Id.

133. Updating and Modernizing Overtime Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,211
(Mar. 13, 2014). It should be noted that in remarks accompanying his signing of the
memorandum, President Obama referenced Congress's inaction on worker pay,
saying, "[W]hile Congress decides what it's going to do-whether it's going to do
anything about this issue-and I hope that it does, and I know Democrats are
pushing hard to get minimum wage legislation passed-I'm going to do what I can
on my own to raise wages for more hardworking Americans." Remarks by the
President on Overtime Pay, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Mar. 13,
2014, 2:27 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/13
/remarks-president-overtime-pay# [https://perma.cc/R6DS-UE4C].
134. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391 (May
23, 2016). The rule was invalidated in Nevada v. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, 218 F. Supp.
3d 520 (E.D. Texas 2016) (issuing nationwide injunction against Obama
Administration's overtime rule).
135. LEE, supra note 112, at 61.

136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 61-62.
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at least some members of the minority party do not raise their
voices against the alleged encroachment by the President. The
cross-party coalition necessary to effectively check the executive
is significantly less likely under conditions that appear to
undermine the electoral objectives of political parties. 1 3 8
All of this creates a partisan, polarized, and impotent Congress in a system of separated powers. And the resulting vacuum
is irresistible for a President wishing to act unilaterally.
D. UnilateralPresidentialAction
Having briefly described the circumstances that undermine
Congress's capacity to legislate or respond to another branch's
first move, we now turn to a discussion of unilateral executive
action, which is often the trigger for the nationwide injunction.
Traditional conceptions of presidential power suggest that
the President is a relatively weak player in the American policymaking landscape. 1 3 9 This traditional conception of the presidency and its power suggests that the President is endowed
largely with the power to persuade other institutional actors to
carry out his policymaking vision; he must rely on the Senate to
confirm his most important agents, and he is limited to vetoing
the legislative enactments coming from Congress. 140 Indeed, under this conception the President is a uniquely vulnerable actor
in the American political landscape, as he is held accountable for
an increasing number of things that are simply outside of his

138. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006) (arguing that "competition between
the legislative and executive branches var[ies] significantly and may all but
disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or
unified by political party").
139. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). Compare Federalist 51's depiction of the executive to its depiction of the
legislature. James Madison wrote, "It may even be necessary to guard against
dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the
legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified." Id. See also
Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and PresidentialPower, 61 J. POL. 445, 445
(1999) ("The standard conception of the presidency is that the office is constrained
by the separation of powers and general weakness of the chief executive's formal
powers.").
140. For the classic discussion predicated on the limited formal power of the
presidency, see RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 29-49

(1990).
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unilateral control. 141 This account of the presidency's powers describes the President's central activity as bargaining with other
actors to achieve policy outcomes. 14 2 Contemporary accounts
suggest that the presidency's capacity to bargain has been remarkably enhanced in the modern era. 1 4 3 Increases in the
strength and scope of the institutionalized presidency provide
the modern President the ability to ensure certain advantages
when dealing with other actors. 144
Other contemporary accounts of presidential power reject
the notion that the President is limited to bargaining with legislative or bureaucratic actors. Instead, they contend the modern
presidency is endowed with significant ability to exercise power
beyond bargaining through the exercise of unilateral action.145
Political scientist William Howell has described this phenomenon, saying:

141. Arguments for protection of unilateral executive authority rest on claims of
the President's unique vulnerability. See e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (invalidating a double for-cause
removal restriction on the members of the PCAOB, arguing that it made the
President unable to control actors for whose actions he would be held accountable
by the public).
142. NEUSTADT, supra note 140, at 32 (describing that the President's power to
command is limited and that what remains is the power to bargain with other
institutional actors who have their own interests and preferences).
143. See Aaron Wildavsky, supra note 26, at 162-73 (discussing the differences
in presidential bargaining position in the domestic and foreign policy domain,
arguing that the President has greater bargaining advantages in the foreign policy
domain).
144. The conception that the presidency had differential bargaining power
across the landscape of American policymaking underwrote the "two presidencies"
thesis of the 1960s, which argued that the President's bargaining capacity in foreign
affairs gave him the ability to achieve greater success against Congress than he
was able to achieve in domestic affairs. One of the explanations for the presidential
advantage in this domain was the rise of the executive-controlled national security
state, which exacerbated the information asymmetries between Congress and the
President from an institutional perspective. See id.; see also IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR
ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL ORIGIN OF OUR TIME 373-79, 444-54 (2013) (describing
how the President's acquisition of authority over the budget and national security
greatly enhances his policy-making ability).
145. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE
POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 14 (2003) ("[M]odern presidents often
exert power by setting public policy on their own and preventing Congress and the
courts-and anyone else for that matter-from doing much about it."). Howell
emphasizes the President's ability to act unilaterally in policy domains, but others
argue that the presidency is more powerful than we once thought by virtue of the
growth of the presidency as an institution.
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Because of his unique position within a system of separated
powers, the president has numerous opportunities to take independent action, with or without expressed consent of either
Congress or the courts.... The number of these unilateral
actions has literally skyrocketed during the modern era ...
[W]hile the growth of the presidency as an institution ...
augments presidential power, it is the ability to set policy
unilaterally that deserves our immediate and sustained attention. 1 4 6
Some commentators who have paid attention to the aggrandizement of the modern American presidency do not like what
they see. For example, Peter Shane argues that the modern presidency, especially its increasing capacity to act unilaterally, represents "Madison's nightmare." 14 7 Shane argues that the
President increasingly has the capacity to initiate policy without
either much prior, public ventilation or the obligation to engage
other institutional actors. 14 8 He asserts that "our constitution
does not support our extreme contemporary presidentialism,"
which poses risks to democratic governance. 149
A focus on the increased capacity of the modern presidency
to undertake unilateral policy action reveals the structural dimension of the litigation of which the nationwide injunction has
been a consequence. This is further enhanced when, as above,
we take into account the declining capacity of Congress to shape
the policy landscape. Congressional gridlock might not have led
to an increase in the kinds of disputes that have resulted in the
issuance of nationwide injunctions were it not for a presidency
with a larger toolkit with which to intervene in policy.
Many of the most recent deployments of the nationwide injunction by federal district courts have been in cases involving
unilateral presidential action, yet this dynamic has not figured
prominently in discussions about the courts' role. Rather than
focusing on the nationwide injunction, the following subsections

146.

Id. at 13.

147. PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE:
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).

How EXECUTIVE POWER

148. Id. at 20-21.
149. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). It is not altogether clear that Shane separates
genuine unilateral presidential action from the sorts of things that Howell might
understand as giving the President bargaining advantages. But it is not difficult to
conclude that Shane's criticism of unilateral presidential actions would likely be at
least as strong as it is against the idea of a unilateral executive.
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focus on the steps taken by Presidents Obama and Trump to advance their policy objectives across different domains. The
longer narrative of the nationwide injunction comes into view
when we turn our attention to both unilateral presidential actions, and the often-preceding congressional inaction, to which
it is often a response. This narrative moves us beyond a focus on
the federal courts.
1.

Obama, Unilateral Action, and the Rhetoric of
Congressional Impotence

Obama's unilateral actions-described below-demonstrate
his attempts to justify his actions as responses to congressional
inaction. Obama often invoked partisan delay as the basis for his
actions. What follows are descriptions of Obama's unilateral activity related to immigration and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons.
a. UnilateralAction on Immigration
On June 15, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from the
Rose Garden on immigration in which he announced the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program. 150
There, he made the substantive case for not deporting "talented
young people" who were assets to the country. 151 But he also
justified his action as a response to Congress's failure to enact
the DREAM Act. 152 "I have said time and time again to Congress
that, send me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and I will sign
150. Remarks by the President on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT
BARACK OBAMA (June 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration
[hereinafter
2012
Remarks on Immigration] [https://perma.cc/W2UU-8NFU].
151. Id.
152. The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act of
2001 was originally introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch. The original legislation
would have authorized the Attorney General to cancel the deportation of a person
age twenty-one or younger, who: (1) had earned a high school or equivalent diploma;
(2) had been physically present for at least five years immediately preceding the
date of enactment of the statute; and (3) was not otherwise inadmissible or
deportable for certain criminal convictions or on security grounds. DREAM Act of
2001, S. 1291, 107th Cong. § 3 (2d Sess. 2001). In his speech introducing the
legislation, Senator Hatch declared, "The purpose of the DREAM Act is to ensure
that we leave no child behind, regardless of his or her legal status in the United
States or their parents' illegal status." 145 CONG. REC. S8581 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
2001), (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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it right away," declared Obama. 15 3 "Democrats passed the
DREAM Act in the House, but Republicans walked away from
it." 154

Later in the speech Obama implored Congress to act, saying, "Precisely because [DACA] is temporary, Congress needs to
act. There is still time for Congress to pass the DREAM Act this
year .

. . ."155

Obama recalled earlier bipartisanship on this im-

migration policy, saying that Democrats and Republicans had
both written and sponsored versions of the DREAM Act and that
he had joined Republicans in voting for earlier DREAM Act legislation when he had been in the Senate. 156 Obama was clearly
blaming what he took to be the breakdown of bipartisanship in
Congress-presumably the fault of the Republicans-for the institution's failure to act on this immigration reform. 157 Obama
framed DACA as a refinement of the executive's enforcement
discretion, which allowed it to prioritize certain individuals for
removal as against others. 158
On November 20, 2014, President Obama addressed the nation in a nighttime speech in which he announced additional policy efforts to fix this broken immigration system. 159 Though he
defended the legality of his unilateral action, Obama emphasized the context in which that action came about-namely,
what he described as Congress's unwillingness to act. 160 He applauded the fact that "68 Democrats, Republicans, and independents came together to pass a bipartisan bill in the
Senate." 16 1 He specifically criticized the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives, stating:
Had the House of Representatives allowed that kind of bill
a simple yes-or-no vote, it would have passed with support
from both parties, and today it would be the law. ...

153.

2012 Remarks on Immigration, supra note 150.

154.
155.

Id.
Id.

156.

Id.

157.

Id.

158.
159.

Id.
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE

HOUSE

PRESIDENT

BARACK

OBAMA

(Nov.

20,

2014,

8:01

PM),

https://

obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/F96V-27LP].
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Now, I continue to believe that the best way to solve this
problem is by working together to pass [comprehensive immigration reform legislation]. But until that happens, there
are actions I have the legal authority to take as President
162

Among those actions were "steps to deal responsibly with the
millions of undocumented immigrants who already live in our
country." 16 3 Obama described those steps, saying:
Now here's the thing: We expect people who live in this
country to play by the rules. We expect that those who cut the
line will not be unfairly rewarded. So we're going to offer the
following deal: If you've been in America for more than five
years; if you have children who are American citizens or legal
residents; if you register, pass a criminal background check,
and you're willing to pay your fair share of taxes-you'll be
able to apply to stay in this country temporarily without fear
of deportation. You can come out of the shadows and get right
with the law. That's what this deal is. 164

Obama defended the legitimacy of his moves as consistent
with "the kinds of actions taken by every single Republican President and every single Democratic President for the past half
century." Focusing again on Congress, he declared, "And to those
in Congress who question my authority to make our immigration
system work better . . . where Congress has failed, I have one
answer: Pass a bill."16 5
Obama asserted that he was motivated to act unilaterally
because of congressional inaction on immigration, seemingly despite substantive support for the policy reform at issue. This Essay has argued that the President is emboldened to move unilaterally because he is likely aware that he will not be successfully
confronted by Congress for the same reason. Indeed, even where
Democrats in Congress might have institutional concerns about
presidential overreach, the partisan divides in Congress incentivize congressmembers to emphasize their partisan identities
over protecting congressional prerogatives, making confronta162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tion even less likely. And a similar issue arose with respect to
the LGBT community-and particularly transgender students
in America's schools.
b.

UnilateralAction on LGBT Rights

On May 13, 2016, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division and the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
in the issued a "Dear Colleague" letter ("the Letter") to school
districts across the country. Justice and Education framed this
letter as a response to "an increasing number of questions from
parents, teachers, principals, and school superintendents about
6
civil rights protections for transgender students." 16
The Letter further explained that, in their implementation
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"),
which prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of Federal
funds, gender identity would be treated as sex. 167 The Letter explained that the two Departments' understanding of Title IX
prohibited schools receiving federal funds from treating "a
transgender student differently from the way it treats other students of the same gender identity." 16 8 The Letter provided further guidance regarding the treatment of transgender students
in different venues and opportunities-including restrooms,
locker rooms, and athletics.1 6 9 Specifically, the Letter stated
that schools could not, consistent with Title IX, prohibit
"transgender students access to .

..

facilities consistent with

their gender identity."1 7 0 Nor could a school require a
transgender student to use a single-occupant restroom if other
students could use multi-occupant restrooms.171 While the Letter did not articulate a specific policy on the treatment of
transgender athletes, the Letter prohibited what it called reliance "on overly broad generalizations or stereotypes about the

166. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER
ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 1 (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices
11ist/ocrIletters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cclAH43Q62J].
167. The Letter defined gender identity as "an individual's internal sense of
gender." It noted that gender identity "may be different from or the same as the
person's sex assigned at birth." Id. at 1.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 3.
170.
17 1.

Id.
Id.
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differences between transgender students and other students of
the same [gender identity]." 1 72
The "Dear Colleague" Letter did not invoke congressional
inaction as the basis of its administrative action, but the Letter
came against the backdrop of Congress's failure to add key protections for LGBT persons to the nation's civil rights canon, especially with respect to employment discrimination. 173 Nearly
two years before the Justice Department waded into the controversy over North Carolina's legislation requiring sex-segregated
public restrooms to be used only by persons whose birth sex
match the bathroom's sex assignment, President Obama acted
unilaterally to issue protections guarding against LGBT discrimination by federal contractors. In a July 21, 2016, speech
accompanying the signing of Executive Order 13672, President
Obama declared:
Congress has spent 40 years-four decades--considering legislation that would help solve the problem [of discrimination
against LGBT persons]. That's a long time. And yet they still
haven't gotten it done.. .. But I'm going to do what I can with
the authority I have to act. The rest of you, of course, need to
keep putting pressure on Congress to pass federal legislation
that resolves this problem once and for all. 174
Obama referenced Congress's inability to enact civil rights
protections for LGBT persons in the workplace. 175 As Obama

172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President

at Signing of Executive Order on LGBT Workplace Discrimination (July 21, 2014).
175. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) was originally
introduced in 1994. In 2007, ENDA was introduced for the first time with
protections against discrimination on the basis of gender identity, but the provision
was removed before passage in the House of Representatives, the first time the
legislation passed in either house of Congress. In 2013, a bill that included
protections for transgender persons was passed in the Senate but did not receive a
vote in the House of Representatives. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Senate PassesLGBT
Anti-Discrimination Bill, CNN (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07
/politics/senate-lgbt-workplace-discriminationlindex.html [https://perma.cc/DAV38X2S]; Lauren Smith, ENDA Has Been Waiting 2 Decades for Passage, ROLL CALL
(July 10, 2013), https://www.rollcall.com/news/enda hasbeenwaiting_2-decades
for passage-226257-1.html [https://perma.cc/AW38-Q5BB]; Deirdre Walsh, LGBT
Anti-DiscriminationBill Going Nowhere in the House, CNN (Nov. 7, 2013), https://
www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/politics/Igbt-workplace-discrimination-house-outlook
/index.html [https://perma.cc/39ZW-N8FA].
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stated, the issue of workplace discrimination against LGBT
6
workers had been stalled in Congress for several years.1 7
Obama sought to draw attention to Congress's failure to enact
protective legislation as the basis for his having taken unilateral
action to eliminate discrimination in the sector of the economy
over which he could exercise authority.
2. Trump, Unilateral Action, and the Delivery of
Wins for His Electoral Coalition
While less explicit in justifying his action as a confrontation
with an ineffectual Congress, perhaps because his party controlled both houses when he assumed the presidency, President
Trump also intimated that he acts unilaterally either to spur
congressional action or in the absence of congressional action.
Less than a week after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13769, which was entitled "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States," known as the "travel ban." 17 7 Executive Order 13769,
though superseded by subsequent executive orders, initially
halted the issuance of visas to citizens of seven majority-Muslim
countries: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and
Yemen. 178 The Order also made significant changes to U.S. refugee policy, including suspending the acceptance of new refugees into the United States for four months. 1 7 9 The Order also
reduced the number of refugee visas from 110,000 (set by the
Obama Administration) to 50,000.180 More specifically, the Order announced the suspension of issuing visas to Syrian refugees
altogether.181 Commentators on Trump's action noted that it
was consistent with his statements on the campaign trail, which
called for a ban on allowing Muslim travelers into the United
States. 1 8 2 Others noted that Trump's use of the Executive Order
176.
177.
13,769
178.
179.

180.

Smith, supra note 175.
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Executive Order
was superseded by Exec. Order 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
Exec. Order 13,769 at 8978.
Id. at 8979.

Id.

181. Id.
182. See Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, 'I Think Islam Hates Us'. A
Timeline of Trump's Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20,
2
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 017/05/20/i-thinkislam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/ [https://
perma.cc[RJL2-5LKFI.
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was intended to deliver an early victory on a contentious issue
to his political base. 183
Just two days before issuing the travel ban order, Trump
issued Executive Order 13,768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the
Interior of the United States,"184 which was premised on the Administration's assertion that interior enforcement of the immigration laws had been abdicated by the Federal Government and
required restoration. According to the EO, abdication of the Federal government's "sovereign responsibility" was evidenced by
the "exempt[ion] of classes or categories of removable aliens from
potential enforcement"1 8 5 and by the flouting of federal law by
so-called sanctuary jurisdictions.18 6 While the Administration's
response to the former act of abdication had been addressed in
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions' letter rescinding DACA because of its "constitutional defects," 18 7 the EO delegated authority to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to withhold federal grants from places found to be
sanctuary jurisdictions or areas offering safe havens from certain federal immigration laws. 1 8 8

183. It must be made clear that although I highlight the unilateral action of
Presidents Obama and Trump, there are important distinctions in their policies.
Specifically, Obama's issuance of an executive order on the immigrant parents of
American-born children is likely a policy that would have passed in both Houses of
Congress had it been allowed to come to a vote. The fact that a comprehensive
immigration-reform bill, which was co-sponsored by Republicans, passed in the
Senate and was never brought to the floor by the Republican House majority,
suggests that Obama's unilateral action was less an attempt to make policy that
likely would have failed in the legislative branch than an attempt to enact policy
that would not have passed any chamber of Congress. By contrast, it is almost
certain that Trump's travel ban-likely in all of its iterations-was not going to
pass Congress. However, both Trump and Obama were clearly influenced by the
political calculus in making their announcements of unilateral policy change in the
broad area of immigration policy. For a discussion of the electoral considerations of
presidential unilateral policymaking, see Judd, supranote 26.
184. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
185. Id.
186. Id.; see, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The New
Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549, 553-54
(2018) (defining sanctuary jurisdictions as those "declining to participate in federal
immigration enforcement").
187. Letter from Jefferson Sessions, Attorney General, to Elaine Duke, Acting
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 5, 2017). In a tweet, dated
September 5th, President Trump called on Congress to enact legislation legalizing
DACA and threatened that "[if Congress] can't, I will revisit this issue!" Donald
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Sept. 5, 2017, 6:38AM), https://twitter.com
/realDonaldTrump/status/905228667336499200 [https://perma.ccU9WK-PDK7].
188. Exec. Order No. 13,768, at 8801.
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Trump's order gave the Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security the authority to designate a place as a sanctuary jurisdiction, whether or not it had formally designated itself as such. 189 The EO also attempted to expose jurisdictions to
political pressure by making public reports about criminal activity by persons whom a jurisdiction decided not to detain in order
to release into federal custody. 190 The EO further established an
office within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
bureau (ICE) devoted to "provid[ing] proactive, timely, adequate, and professional services to victims of crimes committed
by removable aliens." 1 9 1 The office would also produce "quarterly reports studying the effects of the victimization by criminal
aliens present in the United States." 192
More recently, the Trump Administration turned toward deploying agency lawmaking as the mechanism for making immigration policy. On July 23, 2019, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) promulgated a rule-without undertaking notice
and comment-that eliminated restrictions on the expedited removal of undocumented immigrants. 19 3 The policy eradicated
geographic limitations and significantly expanded the time period during which undocumented immigrants are subject to expedited removal procedures. 194 Specifically, while the previous
policy applied the expedited removal process to those persons
found within one hundred miles of a land border within fourteen
days of their arrival in the United States, the new policy eliminated the one-hundred-mile restriction and expanded the time
period during which expedited removal procedures could be used
to two years.1 9 5
DHS justified its policy change as necessary in the light of
the "ongoing crisis at the southern border," its assertion that a
large number of undocumented immigrants were found beyond
one hundred air miles of a land border, and the strain on immigration courts' resources. 19 6 Further, DHS asserted that overcrowding in detention centers supported the change in agency

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 23,
2019).
194. Id. at 35,412.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 35,411.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

830

[Vol. 91

policy.1 9 7 But at the end of the day, an inactive Congress left the
space for Trump's unilateral action.
3.

The Threat of Unilateral Presidential Authority
and Responses

Trump's immigration orders are but a few examples of the
Administration's attempts to act unilaterally to change immigration and travel policy. Like the Obama Administration and
its policies discussed above, the Trump Administration determined that its policy preferences could best be achieved by "going it alone." These decisions involved matters of policy that
might be hotly contested issues, but unlike those described
above, Trump also acted unilaterally in an area-national security as broadly understood-over which the President has institutional advantages when bargaining with Congress.
Nevertheless, Presidents Obama and Trump forwent the
challenge of attempting to convince opponents on policy issues
that were important for various reasons. The concerns articulated in this Essay are not that the President has no authority
to act unilaterally. The history and practice of presidential authority stands in clear opposition to such an absolutist position.
Rather, the concern is aimed at how exercises of unilateral executive authority in an age of expanded presidential capacity

197. Some might contest my categorization of the agency's attempt to make rules
outside of the notice-and-comment process as unilateral action. Specifically, the
rulemaking involved the Department of Homeland Security, which is somewhat
removed from the President, at least when compared to the issuance of an executive
order. The process for forgoing notice-and-comment rulemaking is also a process
recognized by the Administrative Procedure Act and is sanctioned as a mechanism
for policymaking. The response to each of these arguments-which apply no less to
criticisms of the Obama Administration's actions regarding deferred action and
transgender rights, both of which were mediated through executive agencies-is
that these were executive agencies, rather than independent agencies. The
President's control over these institutions is unquestioned if the President's
authority to remove cabinet officials is a factor in assessing control. In fact, the
unceremonious practice with which President Trump has terminated more than a
few cabinet officials evidences the wide swath of control that the President has over
these bureaucratic officials. See Elias Groll, Robbie Gramer, & Lara Seligman,
Trump Axes Bolton Via Twitter, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 20, 2019), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/10/bolton-trump-fires-national-security-advisor-viatwitter/ [https://perma.cc/N3A5-QD4Q]; Dan Mangan, Rex Tillerson Found Out He
Was Fired as Secretary of State from PresidentDonald Trump's Tweet, CNBC (Mar.
13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/tillerson-learned-he-was-fired-fromtrumps-tweet.html [https://perma.cc/IX7V-3F4F].
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threaten to undermine the system of separation of powers inherent to our national political structure.
At this juncture in American political life, we are faced with
a Congress whose capacity to resolve significant challenges facing our democracy appears to be near an ebb. 198 This not only
incentivizes Presidents to unilaterally claim some victory for
their electoral objectives or their historical reputations but also
makes it less likely that Congress can check a President's assertion of unilateral policymaking authority. The slim margins with
which either party has recently controlled the legislative chamber has made it difficult for legislators to overcome the inevitable
hurdles involved in checking the President, as electoral competitiveness reinforces resort to partisan identification. Invigorated
partisan identities further incentivize the choice to ride a successful President's coattails, rather than confront him and risk
undermining his policy effectiveness. 19 9 The result is an everincreasing accretion of authority to the executive in the name of
effective governance or partisan advantage, which establishes
the presidency as an increasingly powerful actor in the American domestic policy landscape. This is inconsistent with the vision of our government bequeathed to us by the Framers.
To be sure, there are leading scholars who unabashedly demand that we overcome our Madisonian predisposition for an
executive hemmed in by systemic checks. Where Peter Shane
sees a nightmare, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule see Madison's error. 2 0 0 They assert that the modern state requires a
President whose capacities are equal to the challenges he facesfrom global terrorism to financial catastrophe. 2 0 1 They argue
that the historic and contemporary obsession with imposing legal constraints on the presidency assumes that without such
constraints the President's actions cannot be constrained at

198. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
199. LEE, supra note 112, at 61-63 (discussing the ways that legislators are
impacted by having the presidency held by a member of their party).
200. See ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
201. Id. at 41-45 (arguing that before a crisis, Congress is not equipped to
address long-standing problems, and during a crisis, Congress's very structure
disables it from acting decisively in the face of a crisis). Posner and Vermeule assert
that Congress is disabled during pre-crisis periods because they are "mired in
partisan conflict." Id. at 42. Here they conclude the necessity of expanded
presidential authority.
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all. 2 0 2 They reject the Madisonian vision of a hemmed-in presidency as blind to the reality that Presidents are constrained by
"politics and public opinion" anyway. 2 0 3 The reality of running
for office, they argue, exposes any candidate to tremendous scrutiny and intrusions commensurate with the awesome rewards to
be acquired if successful. 2 0 4 In other words, election and reelection impose their own constraints. 2 0 5
Posner and Vermeule's optimistic view suggests two points.
First, our consternation about constraints misperceives the task
of the presidency in the modern world. To Posner and Vermeule,
we fail to understand the ways that, even as the rise of the administrative state has empowered the President, it has simultaneously constrained and further exposed him.
Second, the rise of simultaneous constraints on executive
authority suggests the adaptability of political institutions capable of rebalancing a system that appears out of balance. Enduring values-that is, checks and balances and anti-concentration
of authority-in an evolving polity are protected by the evolutionary capacity of its institutions. Judges, no less than other
institutional actors, have a role to play in this adaptation. This
is not to declare that the nationwide injunction is the best adaptation for the period in which we find ourselves. But it is to stress
that it might be helpful to see it as an adaptation to a broader
environment that includes other actors. To the extent that the
nationwide injunction-which may be understood as an institutional adaptation-is understood to be problematic, the appropriate first response may not be to "cut it out," but rather to
understand how and why the system--or parts of the systemfound it to be useful. Confronting that question directly may
force our polity to address underlying causes of dysfunction, rather than merely cursing the symptom. This Essay is not intended to answer whether we should or should not defend the
nationwide injunction; rather, it has focused on asserting that
before we can answer that question, we ought to ask the right
questions about our institutions and our politics.

202. Id. at 12 ("Liberal legalists equate the absence of effective legal constraints
on the executive with the absence of any constraints, yet even an imperial president
is constrained by politics and public opinion.").
203. Id.
204. Id. at 12-13.

205.

Id.
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CONCLUSION

Whether the nationwide injunction poses as serious a threat
to our institutions as some suggest is unknowable until we stop
isolating the phenomenon from the larger political context that
likely explains at least some of its emergence at this time in our
nation's history. This Essay has attempted to reframe how we
see the nationwide injunction by stepping back from our focus
on courts so that we might get a better picture of the other actors
in the landscape. Seeing the rise of unilateral presidential action
that goes unchecked because of the deficiencies within the legislative branch as a separation-of-powers problem arguably places
the nationwide injunction in a different light.
The capacity of a single actor, even one as uniquely accountable and representative as the President, to act unilaterally and
achieve policy priorities threatens harm to the norms of American governance. When this capacity is unchecked because of
congressional gridlock, and results in the deportation of immigrants without due process protections or the banning of groups
from entering the United States, the consequences become all
the more troubling. And resort to the nationwide injunction appears less deserving of the condemnation that it has received in
some quarters. We must balance these harms against the harms
inflicted on our institutions by federal district judges issuing nationwide injunctions to challenge what is often an unchecked
exercise of authority. Whatever conclusion we reach, the correct
path cannot be based on isolating federal courts and ignoring the
political context in which they operate.
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